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The McCarran Ferguson Act and the New
York Convention for the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: To
Reverse-Preempt or Not?
ClaudiaLait

INTRODUCTION
Recent events have ensured that insurance litigation over
the next couple of years will be voluminous and deal with many
novel questions of law. The 2008 financial crisis has generated
considerable litigation, raising new legal issues.' Insurance litigation is also expected to be extremely active as a result of the
2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill.2 The consequences of insurance
regulation will have a widespread impact on the insurance industry, insurance policy holders, and society at large. At the
same time, the increasingly global nature of commerce has
placed greater emphasis on the importance of international arbitration. Consequently, the validity, content, and interpretation of
arbitration clauses in insurance contracts will be central to the
resolution of the novel legal issues surrounding the current torrent of litigation.

t BS 2007, Duke University; JD Candidate 2012, University of Chicago Law School.
1 See generally David F. Klein et al, Insurance Aftershocks of the FinancialCrisis:
New Coverage Issues in a Brave New World, 4 Bloomberg L Rep - Insurance Law (2010).
2 Almost half of the syndicates in the Lloyd's market have brought claims against
British Petroleum. See Susan Thompson and Robin Pagnamenta, BPoilspill claims could
reach $600 million, online at httpV/business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry-sec
tore/naturalresources/article7l36789.ece (visited Sept 19, 2011). See also Marc
Lanzkowsky, True Impact of Gulf Oil Spill Insurance Claims to be Extensive and Impact
Multiple Insurance Lines of Business, online at http/www.lexisnexis.con/Community/
emergingissues/blogE/gulf oiLspill/archive/2010/06/18/true-impact-of-gulf-oil-spillinsurance-claims-to-be-extensive-and-impact-multiple-insurance-lines-of-business.aspx
(visited Sept 19, 2011). The Lloyd's market is a specialist insurance market. It allows
financial backers, underwriters, and members-individuals and corporations-to come
together to pool and spread risk. It is home to over 50 managing agents and over 80 syndicates. For more information on the Lloyd's market, see httpV/www.lloyds.conLloyds/
About-Lloyde/What-is-LloydwThe-Lloyds-Market (visited Sept 19, 2011).
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The general consensus among scholars is that regulation of
insurance by the states is preferable over federal regulation. 3
Proponents of state regulation argue that states are better situated to effectively regulate insurance matters, and their historical role in regulating insurance has resulted in expertise and
efficiency in regulation.4 Indeed, "the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in
the public interest,"5 and the McCarran Ferguson Act (MFA) 6
provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance."' The MFA
therefore reverses the norm that federal law supersedes conflicting state law, and instead calls for "reverse-preemption"preemption of federal law by a state regulatory statute.8
The Federal Arbitration Act 9 (FAA) provides the framework
for arbitration in the United States. Chapter 2 of the FAA (Convention Act) incorporates the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New
York Convention), a treaty providing that signatory nations
"shall recognize"1 0 arbitration agreements."
There is tension between the MFA and the Convention Act
where state law is enacted for the purpose of regulating insurance conflicts with the terms of the Convention Act. Several circuits have noted this tension. Only two have addressed whether
the MFA permits reverse-preemption of the New York Convention, but these circuits are split on the issue.' 2 This Comment
analyzes the circuit split and the arguments employed by district
courts that have addressed the issue. Ultimately, this Comment
3 Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,26 Fla St U L Rev 625, 668
(1999). See also Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose ofInsuranceRegulation:A Preliminary
Inquiry in the Theory ofInsuranceLaw, 45 Minn L Rev 471, 510 (1961).
4 For a general discussion of state regulation versus federal regulation of insurance,
see Kimball, 45 Minn L Rev 471 (cited in note 3).
5 15 USC § 1011.
6 15 USC §H 1011-1015.
1 15 USC § 1012(b).
8 Safety NationalCasualty Corp v Certain Underwritersat Lloyd's, London, 587 F3d
714, 729 (5th Cir 2009).
9 9 USC § 1 et seq.
10 Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21 UST
2517, TIAS No 6997, Art 11 (1970) ("New York Convention" hereinafter).
11 Act of July 31, 1970, Pub L No 91-368, 84 Stat 692, codified at 9 USC § 201.
12 Compare Stephens v American International Insurance Co, 66 F3d 41 (2d Cir
1995) with Safety National,587 F3d at 721.
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takes the position that the MFA enables state insurance law to
reverse-preempt the New York Convention.
Part I of this Comment summarizes the various approaches
advocated by the circuits that have split on this issue and other
district courts that have addressed whether the MFA should allow state law to reverse-preempt the New York Convention. Part
L.A will explain the history and purpose of the MFA. Part I.B will
explain the history and purpose of the New York Convention,
and Part I.C will examine the tension between the MFA and the
New York Convention and the courts' treatment of this conflict.
Part II argues that the MFA should enable state law to reversepreempt the New York Convention for four reasons. First, the
New York Convention is not a self-executing treaty; therefore, its
operation requires reference to an "Act of Congress." Second, regardless of whether the New York Convention is self-executing or
non-self-executing, it must be treated as an "Act of Congress"
and therefore is subject to the broad scope of the MFA. Third,
under the New York Convention's exceptions, compliance with
the New York Convention is exempted where state insurance law
prohibits the New York Convention's enforcement. Fourth, state
regulation of insurance is preferable and therefore states should
have the ability to determine the terms of their regulatory
schemes. Consequently, the New York Convention cannot prevail
where state insurance law conflicts with its terms. Finally, Part
III provides a brief conclusion.
I. CURRENT LAW
A.

The MFA

"Scholarly writing on insurance regulation generally supports state [as opposed to federal] regulation of insurance." 13
These scholars consider state regulation of insurance to be more
efficient than a federal regulatory system since "states are closer
to the consumers they are protecting and the industry they are
regulating." 14 Because the business of insurance is closely tied to
the welfare of citizens, state regulators have a greater stake than
federal regulators in implementing efficient regulatory schemes
and are therefore generally seen as better positioned to regulate

13 Randall, 26 Fla St U L Rev at 668 (cited in note 3).
14 Id at 665 n 245, quoting National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1996
NAIC Annual Report 15 (1996).
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insurance. 15 State regulation provides "increased opportunities
for citizen participation in government," better encourages
"healthy diversity and opportunities for experimentation with
regulatory structures and content," and enhances democracy and
liberty through checks on various levels of government. 16 In particular, competition among the states provides leverage for the
insurance industry not possible at a federal level, since insurance
companies can escape overly burdensome regulatory regimes by
exiting the forum.1 7 As a result, scholars generally agree that

state insurance regulation is preferable to federal regulation for
the state, its citizens, and the insurance industry.1 8
Congress enacted the IVIFA 19 in 1945 in response to United
States v South-Eastern Underwriters Association.2 0 Prior to
South-Eastern, states had exercised an unencumbered right to
regulate the relationships between insurers and policyholders. 2 1
In South-Eastern, the Supreme Court abandoned that longstanding practice and held that "insurance transactions are subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause." 22 This
"precedent-smashing" decision 23 resulted in "serious concern that
state tax and regulatory schemes would now be found unconstitutional." 24
The MFA was "an attempt to 'turn back the clock' and reinstate the state regulatory scheme that had existed prior to
South-Eastern."25 The MFA provides that "[t]he business of insurance .. . shall be subject to the laws of the several States

which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business," 26 and
that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose
15 Kimball, 45 Minn L Rev at 510 (cited in note 3).
16 Randall, 26 Fla St U L Rev at 665 (cited in note 3).
17 See Kimball, 45 Minn L Rev at 510 (cited in note 3).
18 Randall, 26 Fla St U L Rev at 665 (cited in note 3).
19 15 USC § 1011 et seq.
20 322 US 533 (1944). For an explanation of the Congressional purpose in enacting
the MFA, see SEC vNationalSecurities,Inc, 393 US 453, 458 (1969).
21 See United States Dept of Treasury vFabe,508 US 491, 499 (1993).
22 Kathleen B. Carr, The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in Marine Insurance
Contracts:the Conflict Between the Arbitration Convention and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, 18 Tulane Maritime L J 71, 73 (1993), citing South-Eastern,322 US at 553.
23 HR Rep No 143, 79th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1945).
24 Charles D. Weller, The McCarran-FergusonAct's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language,Historyand Policy, 1978 Duke L J 587, 590 (1978).
25 Carr, 18 Tulane Maritime L J at 74 (cited in note 22), quoting NationalSecurities,
393 US at 459.
26 15 USC § 1012(a).
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unless such Act spe-

cifically relates to the business of insurance." 27 Thus, the MFA
prevents federal regulation from interfering with state insurance
regulation unless such federal regulation is specifically targeted
at regulating insurance. At the same time, the freedom that the
MFA grants the states is limited to insurance regulation. "It
[was] not the intention of Congress in the enactment of this legislation to clothe the States with any power to regulate or tax the
business of insurance beyond that which they had been held to
possess prior to [South-Eastern]."28
B.

The New York Convention and Implementing Legislation

The New York Convention was drafted in 1958 by a United
Nations committee. 29 Under the New York Convention, each signatory nation is required to "recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration" for
any dispute "capable of settlement by arbitration."30 The New
York Convention "secure[d] the several advantages available in
domestic arbitration-speed, informality, economy, [and] expertise of decision makers."3 1 More importantly, the New York Convention enacted uniform standards for the enforcement of contracts, "minimizing uncertainties in dealing with unfamiliar laws
in several foreign jurisdictions."32
Although the United States attended and participated in the
1958 conference, it did not sign the treaty. The United States
Senate instead ratified the New York Convention in 1968.33 But
27 15 USC

§ 1012(b).
28 HR Rep No 143, 79th Cong, 1st Sess 3 (1945).
29 See IndustrialRisk Insurers v MA.N Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F3d 1434,
1440 (11th Cir 1998), citing the New York Convention (cited in note 10). The International Chamber of Commerce submitted the first draft of the New York Convention to the
United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1953. With slight modifications, the
Council submitted the New York Convention to the International Conference in 1958. See
Albert Jan van den Berg, New York Arbitration Convention: History (IncludingTravaux
Preparatoires)(2009), online at http/www.newyorkconvention.org/new-york-conventiorv
history (visited Sept 19, 2011) (summarizing the history of the New York Convention).
30 New York Convention, Art II (cited in note 10).
31 Corcoran vArdra Insurance Co, 77 NY 2d 225, 230 (1990).
32 Id, citing Scherk vAlberto-Culver Co, 417 US 506, 520 n 15 (1974). See also Leonard v. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L J 1049, 1051 (1961)
(recounting the deliberations of the New York Convention and describing accessions'
benefits for the United States); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and InternationalRelations Theory: An Analysis of the World 7hade Organization,44 Duke L J 829, 888 (1995).
13 Corcoran, 77 NY 2d at 231. See also John P. McMahon, Implementation of the UN
Convention on ForeignArbitralAwards in the US, 2 J Marit L & Comm 735, 737 (1971).
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the Senate delayed accession until 1970, after amendments to
the FAA implementing the New York Convention had been enacted. 34 Congress adopted these amendments under Chapter 2 of
the FAA, the Convention Act, which provides that courts of acceding nations must recognize arbitration clauses falling under
the New York Convention. 35
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 in an effort to overcome
American courts' hostility to the arbitration of disputes under
the common law. 36 The FAA governs the federal court enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards made pursuant to such agreements.3 7 Chapter 2 of the FAA consists entirely of the Convention Act. In § 201, it provides that the New
York Convention "shall be enforced" by United States courts "in
accordance with this chapter."3 8 In effect, the Convention Act
replicates the FAA. 39 Both require courts to enforce arbitration
clauses. However, the Convention Act's reach is broader than the
FAA's and "authorizes district courts to order parties to proceed
with a Convention arbitration even outside of the United
States."40 The Convention Act also establishes federal court jurisdiction and venue. 41
C.

Tension between the MFA and the New York Convention

Federal law trumps state law through the Supremacy
Clause. 42 The MFA carves out a statutory exception to this constitutional regime by providing that "[n]o Act of Congress shall
be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted
by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless
34 See McMahon, 2 J Marit L & Comm at 737 (cited in note 33). See also Industrial
Risk Insurers,141 F3d at 1440.
3 9 USC § 201 et seq.
36 CircuitCity Stores v Adams, 532 US 105, 111 (2001). See also HR Rep No 96, 68th
Cong, 1st Sess, 1 (1924) ("Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English
courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate.").
3 See Circuit City, 532 US at 111. See also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos, Inc vDobson,
513 US 265, 271-72 (1995) (explaining the purpose of the FAA).
38 9 USC § 201.
3 See Sedco, Inc v PetroleosMexicanos Mexican National Oil Co, 767 F2d 1140, 1146
(5th Cir 1985).
4o Id. See also 9 USC § 206 ("A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may
direct that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein
provided for, whether that place is within or without the United States.").
41 See 9 USC §§ 203-204.
42 See US Const Art VI, cl 2.
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such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance." 43 The
MFA therefore enables the "reverse-preemption" 44 of federal
law-that is, preemption of federal law by a state regulatory

statute. The Court in United States Dept of Treasury v Fabe5
found that the IFA effectuates reverse-preemption when the
following three conditions are met: (1) the federal law does not
specifically relate to the business of insurance; (2) the federal law
would invalidate, impair, or supersede the state statute if applied; and (3) the state statute was enacted for the purpose of
regulating insurance. 46
The FAA does not regulate the business of insurance. 47 Some
state laws directly conflict with the FAA. 48 When state law regulating the business of insurance is at odds with the terms of the
FAA, courts must reconcile the inherent tension between the
MFA and the FAA. 4 9 Circuits have differed in their approach to
discerning the interaction between the IFA and the FAA, applying Fabds three-part test inconsistently.50
It is not clear that the rule for reverse-preemption in the
context of domestic arbitration also applies to international arbitration agreements and treaty obligations.5 1 A circuit split has
recently developed on whether the IVIFA authorizes reverse43

15 USC § 1012(b).

44 Safety NationalCorp, 587 F3d at 720.
4
46

508 US 491 (1993).
Id at 501.

47 See Stephens v American InternationalInsurance Co, 66 F3d 41, 44 (2d Cir 1995)
("No one disputes the fact that the FAA does not specifically relate to insurance.").
48 See, for example, La Rev Stat Ann § 22:868 (voiding arbitration agreements that
deprive Louisiana courts of jurisdiction over insurance actions); Kentucky Liquidation
Act, Ky Rev Stat Ann § 304.33-010(6) (stating that all choice of law or arbitration provisions in a contract to which an insolvent insurer in liquidation proceedings is a party are
"subordinated" to the Act).
49 For a general discussion of courts that have approached this issue, see Amsouth
Bank v George Daleet a], 386 F3d 763, 781-83 (6th Cir 2004).
50 Compare Garcia v Island Program Designer,Inc, 4 F3d 57, 61-62 (1st Cir 1993)
(parsing individual provisions of a federal statute to determine whether the law specifically relates to insurance) with Stephens, 66 F3d at 45 (considering a statutory scheme in
its entirety). See also Munich American Reeinsurance Co v Crawford, 141 F3d 585, 592
(5th Cir 1998) (noting the circuits' different approaches and explaining that "Fabe'sholding in this respect is simply unclear").
51 See Pinnoak Resources, LLC v Certain Underwritersat Lloyd's, London, 394 F
Supp 2d 821, 827-28 (SD WV 2005). Also compare American Bankers Insurance Co of
Florida v Inman, 436 F3d 490, 494 (5th Cir 2006) (holding that the MFA allowed a Mississippi underinsured-motorist law to reverse-preempt the FAA in the context of a dispute between an injured insured and his insurer) with Safety National, 587 F3d at 722
(holding that the New York Convention is not reverse-preempted by a Louisiana statute
which essentially voids arbitration agreements, but not reconsidering Inman's holding
because the issue was not presented for appeal).
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preemption of the New York Convention or the Convention Act
where there is a conflict with state law. 5 2 District courts have
also disagreed on this matter.5 3
The following three subsections explore the disagreements
among the courts that have addressed this issue. Section I.C.1
analyzes the Second Circuit's position in Stephens v American

InternationalInsurance Co.5 4 Section I.C.2 analyzes the Fifth
Circuit's position in Safety National Casualty Corp v Certain
Underwritersat Lloyds, London,55 discussing first the Fifth Circuit's concurrence and then the dissent in order to highlight the
court's conflicting interpretations of the New York Convention.
Section I.C.3 analyzes the discussion in other courts and the arguments they employ in arguing for reverse-preemption.
1. The Second Circuit: the MFA reverse-preempts by the
New York Convention.
a) Stephens. The Second Circuit held in Stephens that
the New York Convention is reverse-preempted by state law
through operation of the MFA.5 6 In its brief opinion on the issue,
from which no judges dissented, the Second Circuit noted the
distinction between a self-executing treaty and a non-selfexecuting treaty, first recognized in the Supreme Court's holding
in Fosterv Neilson,57 which stated:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations,
not

a

legislative

act. .. .

[The United

States C]onsti

tution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is consequently to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent
to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the
terms of stipulation import a contract, when either of the
parties engage to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department;

52 Compare Stephens, 66 F3d at 46 with Safety National,587 F3d at 724.
53 Compare Goshawk DedicatedLtd v Portsmouth Settlement Co I, Inc, 466 F Supp

2d 1293, 1310 (ND Ga 2006) (finding that state law did not reverse-preempt the Convention Act) with Transit CasualtyCo v Certain Underwritersat Lloyd's ofLondon, 1996 US

Dist LEXIS 22710, *8 (WD Mo) (finding that the MFA enabled reverse-preemption).
54 66 F3d 41 (2d Cir 1995).
55 587 F3d 714 (5th Cir 2009).
56 See Stephens, 66 F3d at 45.

51 27 US 253 (1829).
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and the legislature must execute the contract before it can
become a rule for the Court.5 8
Because the New York Convention depends upon an "Act of
Congress," namely the Convention Act, for its implementation,
the Second Circuit held that the New York Convention was not
self-executing.5 9 Consequently, since the MFA mandates that
"[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to . . . supersede any law
... regulating the business of insurance," the Second Circuit held

that the Kentucky Liquidation Act reverse-preempted the Convention Act, and found that the New York Convention itself was
"simply inapplicable in this instance."6 0
b) District and state courts. Case law from both a district court within the Second Circuit and a New York State court
additionally evinces a strong policy in favor of allowing states to
regulate insurance, in spite of the United States' strong policy
favoring arbitration. 6 1 Because the MFA establishes an "express
federal policy of noninterference in insurance matters,"62 the
strong policy favoring arbitration is "not as sacrosanct" so as to
justify refusing operation of the MFA. 63
2.

The Fifth Circuit: the New York Convention Supersedes
the MFA.

a) Safety National. The Safety Nationalcourt included
three dissenting judges and one concurring judge. 64 This Section
analyzes the majority opinion, the concurring opinion, and then
the dissenting opinion.

58 Id at 255, revd on other grounds by United States v Percheman, 32 US 51, 89
(1833) (noting that Spanish portion of treaty provided a new interpretation and changed
earlier understood meaning).
5 Stephens, 66 F3d at 45, citing 9 USC H§ 201-208.
60 Stephens, 66 F3d at 45, quoting 15 USC § 1012(b).
61 See Washburn v Corcoran, 643 F Supp 554, 557 (SDNY 1986) (holding that the
FAA must yield to the MFA); Corcoran v Ardra Insurance Company, Ltd, 77 NY2d 225,
233-34 (NY 1990) (holding that state law prevailed because arbitration was "incapable of
being performed" under the exceptions of the Convention).
62 Levy vLewis, 635 F2d 960, 963 (2d Cir 1980).
63 In Re Board of Directors of Hopewell InternationalInsurance, 238 Bankr 25, 64
(SDNY 1999).
64 See generally Safety National,587 F3d 714.
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(i) Majority opinion. In Safety National, the Fifth Circuit held that the New York Convention is not reversepreempted by state law through operation of the MFA. 65 This is
because: (1) "Congress did not intend to include a treaty within
the scope of an 'Act of Congress' when it used those words in the
MFA," and (2) a treaty, not a domestic statute-here, the New
York Convention, rather than the Convention Act-superseded
state law at issue.6 6
The Fifth Circuit did not decide whether the New York Convention was self-executing. 67 The court considered the question of
self-execution to be irrelevant for the purpose of determining
whether the New York Convention should be considered an "Act
of Congress." 68 This is because Congress had not used the term
"treaty" to exclude implemented non-self-executing treaties in
several federal statutes. 9 Further, the court found "no apparent
reason" why Congress would have distinguished self-executing
implemented treaties from non-self-executing implemented treaties.7 0 This reasoning was supported by case law that analyzed a
treaty that had been implemented by an "Act of Congress" in the
same way as a non-implemented treaty.7 1 Therefore, a non-selfexecuting treaty should have the same force as a self-executing
treaty.
Additionally, since "[a]n action or proceeding falling under
the [New York] Convention shall be deemed to arise under the
laws and treaties of the United States," Congress recognized that
actions under the New York Convention "arose not only under
the laws of the United States but also under treaties of the United States." 72 The Fifth Circuit therefore concluded that Congress
had recognized that jurisdiction over actions to enforce the New
York Convention did not arise solely under an "Act of Congress." 73

65 Id at 732.
66 Id at 718.

61 See id at 721 ("It is unclear to us whether the [New York] Convention is selfexecuting.").
68 See Safety National,587 F3d at 721-24.
69 See id at 723 n 35, citing Revenue Act of 1941, Pub L No 77-250, § 109, 55 Stat
687, 695 (1941) and Farm Labor Supply Appropriation Act, Pub L No 78-229, § 3, 58 Stat
11, 13 (1944).
'0 See Safety National,587 F3d at 727-28.
71 See id at 727-29 (discussing Missouri vHolland, 252 US 416 (1920)).
72 Safety National,587 F3d at 724, quoting 9 USC § 203.
7 See id at 724-25.
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The Fifth Circuit also held that a "treaty (the [New York]
Convention), not an 'act of Congress' (the Convention Act)" superseded state law. 7 4 The Convention Act states that the New
York Convention "shall be enforced in United States courts in
accordance with this chapter" 75 and defines when an arbitration
agreement "falls under the [New York] Convention." 76 The Fifth
Circuit reasoned that:
It is the [New York] Convention under which legal
agreements "fall"; it is an action or proceeding under the
[New York] Convention that provides the court with jurisdiction; such an action or proceeding is "deemed to
arise under the laws and treaties" of the United States,
the treaty in this case being the [New York] Convention;
and when chapter 1 of title 9 (the FAA) conflicts with the
[New York] Convention, the [New York] Convention applies.77
Because "the Convention Act does not ...

operate without

reference to the contents of the [New York] Convention,"78 it was
not the Convention Act, but the New York Convention, an implemented treaty, that superseded state law. The Fifth Circuit
therefore concluded that the MFA's "provision that 'no Act of
Congress' should supersede state insurance law was inapplicable." 79
(ii) Concurrence. The concurrence noted that if the New
York Convention were not self-executing, state law would supersede the New York Convention because a non-self-executing
treaty's force is derived from its enabling legislation.80 Instead,
the concurrence argued that the New York Convention is selfexecuting and therefore supersedes state law by operation of the
Supremacy Clause.8 1

74 Id at 723.
7 9 USC § 201.
7 9 USC § 202.
7 Safety National,587 F3d at 724-25 (internal citations omitted).
78 Id at 724.

7 Id at 725.
80 Id at 733 (Clement concurring) (stating that the dissent "persuasively refutes" the
majority's argument, but that the dissent's argument relies on the finding that the Convention is self-executing).
8 Safety National,587 F3d at 732 (Clement concurring).
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The Supreme Court provided guidance on analyzing whether
a treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing in Medellin v Texas.82 Medellin "recognized the distinction between treaties that
automatically have effect as domestic law, and those that-while
they constitute international law commitments-do not by themselves function as binding federal law" and identified "explicit
textual expression" as the focus of the self-execution analysis. 83
The Medellin court noted that treaty provisions setting forth international obligations in mandatory terms "tilt strongly toward
self-execution." 84
Noting that the New York Convention provides that a "court
... shall ...

refer the parties to arbitration" and that this consti-

tutes "a directive to domestic courts," the concurrence concluded
that Article II of the New York Convention is self-executing.8 5
Therefore, Article II is fully enforceable in domestic courts by its
own operation and is "entitled to recognition as 'the supreme
Law of the Land' under the Supremacy Clause." 86
(iii) Dissent. The dissenting opinion emphasized that
the New York Convention has no legal effect in the United States
absent the enabling provisions of the Convention Act.87 Non-selfexecuting treaties, it reasoned, have no effect outside of implementing legislation under the Supremacy Clause.88 According to
the dissent, the New York Convention derives its legal force from
the Convention Act.89 Since the Convention Act is an "Act of
Congress," the MFA enables the Louisiana law to reversepreempt the New York Convention. The dissent noted that case
law from other circuits supports this proposition.90

82 552 US 491 (2008).

83 Id at 504, 513 (quotation marks omitted).
84 Safety National, 587 F3d at 735 (Clement concurring), citing Medelln, 552 US at
509 n 5.
85 Safety National,587 F3d at 735 (Clement concurring), quoting New York Convention (cited in note 10); Medellin, 552 US at 508.
86 Safety National,587 F3d at 735 (Clement concurring), quoting US Const Art VI,
cl 2.
87 See Safety National,587 F3d at 740-45 (Elrod dissenting).
38 See id at 742.
89 See id at 743.
90 See Safety National, 587 F3d at 742-43, citing Stephens, 66 F3d at 45; Suter v
Munich Reinsurance Co, 223 F3d 150, 160-62 (3d Cir 2000) (framing the same preemption issue in terms of whether there was a conflict between the Convention Act and a
contrary New Jersey statute).
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District Courts.

In refusing to find reverse-preemption of the New York Convention by the MFA, district courts have (1) limited the scope of
the MFA, 9 1 (2) limited defenses under the New York Convention,92 (3) argued that there is a strong policy favoring the enforcement of international arbitral agreements, 93 and (4) applied
the last-in-time rule, which requires that later-enacted rules
prevail over earlier inconsistent rules. 94
On the other hand, district courts that have held that the
MFA reverse preempts the New York Convention apply the MFA
by its terms and find reverse-preemption where the Fabe test is
satisfied.
a) Arguments employed when refusing to find reversepreemption.
(i) Limiting the scope of the MFA. Several district courts
have held that the MFA does not reverse-preempt the New York
Convention by reasoning that the MFA's scope is limited to interstate commerce.9 5 These courts note that the MFA "has never
been held to have abrogated federal procedural practices in federal court cases," 96 and therefore the MFA was intended to apply
to interstate commerce rather than foreign commerce. Under the
Convention Act, "[a]n agreement ...

arising out of such a rela-

tionship which is entirely between citizens of the United States
shall be deemed not to fall under the [New York] Convention."97
Therefore, arbitration agreements under the New York Conven91 See, for example, ContinentalInsurance Co vdantran,Inc,906 F Supp 362 (ED La
1995).
92 See, for example, Goshawk, 466 F Supp 2d at 1305-06.
9 See, for example, Certain Underwritersat Lloyd's v Simon, 2007 US Dist LEXIS
77686 (SD Ind).
94 See, for example, IndustrialRisk Insurers, 141 F3d at 1440, citing Sedco, 767 F2d
at 1145.
9 See, for example, Continental,906 F Supp at 366; Antillean Marine Shipping Corp
v Through TransportMutual Insurance Ltd, 2002 WL 32075793, *3 (SD Fla); McDermott
International,Inc v UnderwritersatLloyd's London, 1992 WL 37695, *4 (ED La).
96 McDermott International,1992 WL 37695 at *4 n 11, citing Triton Lines, Inc v
Steamship Mutual UnderwritingAssociation, 707 F Supp 277, 278-79 (SD Tex 1989). See
also Stephens v National Distillers and Chemical Corp, 69 F3d 1226, 1231 n 5 (2d Cir
1995) (declining to address whether the MFA is limited to interstate and not foreign
commerce, but noting that "there is some indication in the legislative history of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act that it was intended to apply only to [Interstate] Commerce
Clause legislation").
9

9 USC § 202.
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tion necessarily involve foreign commerce. Under this line of
thinking, because the MFA purportedly does not apply to foreign
commerce, the MFA does not enact reverse-preemption when the
New York Convention applies.
(ii) Limiting defenses available under the New York
Convention. Similarly, the district court for the Northern District
of Georgia refused to find reverse-preemption by holding that the
Eleventh Circuit had previously limited the defenses available in
international arbitration to those recognized by the New York
Convention.98 The Eleventh Circuit had earlier held that because
of "the unique circumstances of foreign arbitration, . . . domestic

defenses to arbitration may only be recognized under the [New
York] Convention if there exists a precise, universal definition
... that may be applied effectively across the range of countries
that are parties to the [New York] Convention."9 9 Because the
MFA is not capable of universal application, it is not recognized
as a defense under the New York Convention. Therefore, the
court concluded that New York Convention is supreme over state
insurance law. 0 0
(iii) Relying on policy favoring arbitration. Some district
courts supplement their holdings that the New York Convention
is not reverse-preempted by the MFA with the strong policy favoring arbitration clauses.1 01 By relying on the strong policy of
international comity and predictability in enforcing arbitration
clauses in the context of international commerce, the Supreme
Court has upheld international arbitration agreements that
would otherwise be unenforceable in domestic contexts. 102
(iv) The New York Convention must be enforced over all
prior inconsistent rules of law. Some courts conclude that since
9 Goshawk, 466 F Supp 2d at 1305-06 (refusing to find reverse-preemption because
the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the Convention prevails over previously enacted
inconsistent rules of law, and because of the strong policy for international comity warranting international arbitration).
99 Id, citing Bautista v Star Cruises, 396 F3d 1289, 1302 (11th Cir 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
100 Goshawk, 466 F Supp 2d at 1306.
101 See, for example, id; Simon, 2007 US Dist LEXIS 77686 at *17, citing Goshawk
466 F Supp 2d at 1303; Murphy Oil USA, Inc v SR InternationalBusiness Insurance Co,
2007 US Dist LEXIS 69732, *10 (WD Ark).
102 See Goshawk, 466 F Supp 2d at 1306, citing Scherk, 417 US at 516; Mitsubishi
Motors Corp vSoler Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc,473 US 614, 658-62 (1985).
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"[t]he Convention must be enforced according to its terms over
all prior inconsistent rules of law,"103 and because MFA was enacted prior to the implementation of the New York Convention,
the New York Convention should prevail. 10 4
b) Argument employed when fnding reversepreemption. Though the Eighth Circuit has not decided the issue,105 a district court within the circuit held in Transit Casualty
Co v Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London1 06 that the MFA
does cause reverse-preemption of the New York Convention.10
The district court held that a Missouri anti-arbitration statute
reverse-preempted both the FAA and the New York Convention
by operation of the MFA. 08 Because the New York Convention
did not apply, the district court remanded the case to state court
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 0 9 The Eighth Circuit ultimately did not address the FAA issue and dismissed the appeal
of the district court's decision as it found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order under 28 USC § 1447(d), which provides
that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which
it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise."110
I. PROPOSED RESOLUTION
Part II of this Comment advocates that the MFA should
permit reverse-preemption of the New York Convention for four
reasons. This section addresses each of these arguments in turn.
Part II.A argues that the New York Convention is not selfexecuting; its authority is derived from an "Act of Congress,"
which is subject to reverse-preemption of the MFA. Part II.B
notes that, irrespective of whether the New York Convention is
self-executing or non-self-executing, as a treaty it should be
treated as an "Act of Congress," subject to the broad applicability
of the MFA. Part II.C argues that the New York Convention exempts compelling arbitration where an agreement to arbitrate
1
104

IndustrialRisk Insurers,141 F3d at 1440, quoting Sedco, 767 F2d at 1145.
See, for example, Goshawk, 466 F Supp 2d at 1305; Murphy Oil, 2007 US Dist

LEXIS 69732 at *9.
105

See Transit Casualty Co v Certain Underwritersat Lloyd's London, 119 F3d 619,

623 (8th Cir 1997).
106 1996 US Dist LEXIS 22710 (WD Mo).
107 Id at *3.
08 Id at '8.
109 Id at *12.

110 7-ansit Casualty,119 F3d at 622, quoting 28 USC

§

1447(d).
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offends the law of the forum, and, therefore, where state law conflicts with the terms of the New York Convention, application of
the New York Convention is exempted. Part II.D asserts that
state regulation of insurance is a preferable regime, and in order
to allow states to perform this function, they must be able to decide the terms of their regulatory regimes, and they are unable to
do this where the terms of the New York Convention prevail over
conflicting state laws.
A.

The New York Convention is Not Self-Executing and Must
be Construed with Reference to the Convention Act

In Medellh, the Supreme Court noted that the existence of
implementing legislation provides a strong indication that the
treaty is not self-executing.1 11 "Such language demonstrates that
Congress knows how to accord domestic effect to international
obligations when it desires such a result,"112 and "Congress has
not hesitated to pass implementing legislation for treaties that in
its view require such legislation." 113 The Convention Act's existence suggests that Congress did not consider the New York Convention to be self-executing.
The Fifth Circuit's Safety National concurrence, in refuting
the idea that the existence of implementing legislation indicates
a non-self-executing treaty, argued that the Medellh court was
interpreting Article III, and not Article II, of the New York Convention." 4 This is because, "[u]nlike Article II, Article III contains no language addressed to the courts of Contracting States
and instead addresses itself only to the Contracting States themselves."115 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit concurrence argued that
the analysis of whether Article II is self-executing was independent from that of Article III.
The Fifth Circuit's Safety Nationalconcurrence is too superficial in its analysis of Article III in this respect. The fact that
Article III lacks instructions explicitly naming the courts of the
contracting state does not mean that Article III was intended to
be non-self-executing while Article II was intended to be selfexecuting. Article III states that "[e]ach Contracting State shall
"1 Medelin, 552 US at 521-22, citing 9 USC §§ 201-208 ("The judgments of a number
of international tribunals enjoy a different status because of implementing legislation
enacted by Congress.").
112 Medellin, 552 US at 522.
113 Id at 522 n 12.

114 See Safety National,587 F3d at 736 (Clement concurring).
115 Id.
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recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territorywhere the award
is relied upon."1 16 This is essentially a broaddirective to the relevant authority in each contracting state to enforce arbitral
awards. It merely considers that enforcement of arbitral awards
might not fall to the judiciary in each contracting state, while
acknowledging that enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate,
instead of to litigate, would necessarily fall upon the contracting
state's judiciary. This is bolstered by various instructions in the
Articles that follow Article III to "the competent authority""'
with respect to the enforcement of arbitral awards. For the United States, this competent authority is the courts. Because Article
III, like Article II, contains a directive to the relevant authority,
the self-execution analysis of Article II must, similar to Article
III, depend in some part upon whether it relies upon implementing legislation.
Article II's operation depends on the Convention Act. Indeed,
the Convention Act plays a necessary role in the operation of the
New York Convention. The New York Convention applies to an
unlimited range of arbitral agreements between signatory nations, of which only a subset are enacted through the Convention
Act.118 Paragraph 1 of Article I of the New York Convention provides that the New York Convention applies to the recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards without any limitation as to
the nature of the relationship that gives rise to the award, while
paragraph 3 of Article I of the New York Convention permits a
state party to the New York Convention to file a declaration that
the New York Convention will apply only to legal relationships
that are considered as commercial under the national law of the
state.1 19 The United States did file such a declaration because its
"purpose in adhering to the [New York] Convention is for the
beneficial effects it will produce for the foreign commerce of the
United States and not to make any changes with respect to matters that are traditionally within the jurisdiction of the 50 states
of the Union." 120 Because of this, the Advisory Committee on Private International Law found it "necessary to include the sub116
117

New York Convention, Art III (cited in note 10) (emphasis added).
See, for example, id at Art V.

§ 202.
119 See New York Convention, Art I (cited in note 10).
120 Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91 Cong, 2d Sess 33-34 (1970)
(statement of Richard D. Kearney, Chairman of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law).
11s Compare New York Convention (cited in note 10) with 9 USC
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stance of this limiting declaration in the legislation that implements the [New York] Convention." 12 1
Therefore, not all arbitral agreements enforceable under the
New York Convention are enforceable under the Convention Act,
and to discern which arbitral agreements are enforceable under
the New York Convention within the United States requires reference to the Convention Act. As a result, the Fifth Circuit's reliance on the fact that they construe the New York Convention
itself, rather than its implementing legislation, to supersede
state law is untenable. Since it is necessary to construe the Convention Act in order to enforce the New York Convention, it cannot be the case that the Fifth Circuit simply construed the New
York Convention to preempt the MFA; reference to the Convention Act was necessary. Thus, it must be an "Act of Congress"
that the Fifth Circuit construed. Under the 1VIFA, this is impermissible.
The text of the New York Convention strongly suggests that
the New York Convention is not self-executing. "The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with
its text."122 The language of the treaty demonstrates whether it
was the signatories' intent to ratify the treaty's terms "by force of
the instrument itself."123 Because the enforceability of the New
York Convention cannot be ascertained without reference to the
Convention Act, it is unlikely that the New York Convention was
intended to be a self-executing treaty.
The Fifth Circuit's Safety National concurrence also argued
that Article II's "directive to domestic courts" 124 indicated that
Article II was self-executing. Because such mandatory terms "tilt
strongly toward self-execution,"125 the Fifth Circuit concurrence
argued that Article II was self-executing and fully enforceable in
domestic courts by its own operation.126 However, as noted, the
text of Article I notes that a contracting state may limit the scope
of applicability of the New York Convention, and the United

121 Id at 34 (emphasis added).
122 Medellin, 552 US at 506 (internal citation omitted).

123 United States vPemcheman, 32 US 51, 89 (1833) (holding that the Spanish translation of a treaty that was held to be self-executing was non-self-executing in English because "the language of" the treaty indicated the signatories' intent to ratify and confirm
the terms of the treaty "by force of the instrument itself").
124 Safety National,587 F3d at 735 (Clement concurring), quoting Medellin, 552 US at
508.
125 Safety National,587 F3d at 735 (Clement concurring).
126 Id.
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States has done this through its implementing legislation. 127

Further, though the Fifth Circuit's Safety National concurrence
interprets Article II to say that "[r]eferral to arbitration is mandatory, not discretionary," 128 a court of the contracting state retains discretion over referral to arbitration where enforcement of
the New York Convention is "contrary to the public policy" of
that state. 129
Additionally, the Supreme Court's holding in SanchezLlamas v Oregon 30 indicates that purposive interpretation also
plays a role in treaty interpretation. 13 1 Citing Sanchez-Llamas,
the Medelln2 court analyzed the United States' intent in acceding
to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention), under which it had agreed to submit disputes arising
out of the Vienna Convention to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).132 The Court noted that:
Given that ICJ judgments may interfere with state procedural rules, one would expect the ratifying parties to the
relevant treaties to have clearly stated their intent to give
those judgments domestic effect, if they had so intended.
Here there is no statement . . . that supports the notion

that ICJ judgments displace state procedural rules. 133
With respect to the New York Convention, instead of there
being no statement that the New York Convention should displace state rules, there is an explicit statement to the contrary.
Indeed, Richard D. Kearney, the Chairman of the Secretary of
State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, stated
at the hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee that the
New York Convention does not alter or change a citizen's rights
under state law. 134
See 9 USC § 201.
Safety National,587 F3d at 735 (Clement concurring).
New York Convention, Art V (cited in note 10).
548 US 331, 354 (2006).
See Medellin, 552 US at 517, citing Sanchez-Llamas, 548 US at 351. See generally
Abbott v Abbott, 130 S Ct 1983 (2010) (interpreting the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction with reference to the text of the New York Convention, the views of the United States Department of State, related decisions in courts of
other contracting states, and the purposes of the Convention).
132 See Medelhh, 552 US at 517, citing Sanchez-Llamas, 548 US at 351.
133 Medellin, 552 US at 517.
134 See Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91 Cong, 2d Sess 44
(1970) (statement of Richard D. Kearney, Chairman of the Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on Private International Law).
127

128
129
130
131
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Further, congressional intent in ratifying the New York
Convention supports the notion that the treaty was not intended
to be self-executing. Indeed, while the United States attended
and participated in the 1958 conference where the New York
Convention was drafted, it did not sign the treaty until the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification. 13 5 Notably, accession was delayed until enactment of the Convention Act. 136 The
timing of accession demonstrates that the United States signed
the New York Convention intending that the treaty itself not be
self-executing, and therefore found that enactment of the Con137
vention Act was "necessary."
B.

The New York Convention, Self-Executing or Otherwise, is
Equivalent to an "Act of Congress" and is Therefore Subject
to Reverse-Preemption by the Broad Scope of the MFA

Even if the New York Convention were self-executing, the
MFA should enact reverse-preemption of the New York Convention's provisions. This is because an "Act of Congress" does not
distinguish between federal law and treaties. 138 Where a treaty
contains stipulations that are self-executing, those stipulations
"have the force and effect of a legislative enactment." 139 A selfexecuting treaty, then, "is a law of the land as an act of congress
is."140 A treaty is "to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent
to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without
the aid of any legislative provision."141 Since self-executing treaties are the equivalent to legislative enactments, there is no reason to distinguish, for purposes of the MFA, between an "Act of
Congress" and a self-executing treaty that has an equivalent effect to an "Act of Congress."
Some courts that have argued that the MFA does not enact
reverse-preemption of the New York Convention have done so by
limiting the MFA's scope. 142 However, the MFA "intentionally
135 See McMahon, 2 J Marit L & Comm at 737 (cited in note 33).
136 Id.

" Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91 Cong, 2d Sess 34 (1970)
(statement of Richard D. Kearney, Chairman of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law) (emphasis added).
138 See 15 USC § 1012(b).
139 Whitney v Robertson, 124 US 190, 194 (1888).
140 Edye vRobertson, 112 US 580, 598 (1884).
141 Foster vNeilson, 27 US at 254, revd on other grounds by Percheman,32 US at 89
(noting that Spanish portion of the treaty provided a new interpretation and changed the
earlier understood meaning). See also Valentine v UnitedStates, 57 S Ct 100, 103 (1936).
142 See, for example, Safety National,587 F3d at 722 (arguing that the MFA did not
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embraced the full scope of possible federal regulation." 43 In one
of the first cases to be decided following the passage of the MFA,
the Supreme Court noted that "[o]bviously Congress' purpose
was broadly to give support to the existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance."1 44 This
grant of broad discretion to the states evinces a strong intent to
have the MFA apply to any state laws that had been and will be
enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.
Further, the MFA explicitly carves out three exceptions with
respect to which the MFA does not apply. 145 This demonstrates
that limitations to the MPA were clearly contemplated and
should not be implied where absent. Therefore, regardless of
whether the New York Convention is self-executing or otherwise,
its effect should remain that of an "Act of Congress," which under
the MFA is subject to reverse-preemption by state insurance
laws. As noted, the committee hearing ratifying the New York
Convention suggests that the New York Convention was not intended to affect state regimes. 146 It would thus be at odds with
the intent of the MFA and the New York Convention to read the
MFA so narrowly as to limit its application to the arbitral
agreements under the New York Convention.
C.

Recognition of Arbitration Agreements may be Refused Under Exemptions to the New York Convention

Article V lists circumstances under which recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused. These include
instances where "[t]he subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country,
or [t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country." 147 Where state law requires that a dispute be settled in a state court, submitting that
intend for an "Act of Congress" to apply to non-self-executing implemented treaties);
McDermott International,Inc v Underwritersat Lloyd's London, 1992 WL 37695 at *4 n
11 (ED La) (arguing that the MFA "has never been held to have abrogated federal procedural practices in federal court cases," and therefore that the MFA does not apply to
foreign commerce).
143 Steven Koch, McCarran-FergusonAct Immunity from the Truth in Lending Act
and Title VII, 48 U Chi L Rev 730, 735 (1981).
144 PrudentialInsurance Co v Benjamin, 328 US 408, 429 (1946) (emphasis added).
145 See 15 USC § 1014 (providing exemptions for the National Labor Relations Act, the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and the Merchant Marine Act).
146 See Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91 Cong, 2d Sess 44
(1970) (statement of Richard D. Kearney, Chairman of the Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on Private International Law).
147 New York Convention, Art V(2)(aM-b) (cited in note 10) (emphasis added).
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dispute to international arbitration would offend the law of that
state, especially where the MFA directs that state law should
prevail. The New York Convention explicitly contemplates exemption from enforcing arbitral awards under the New York
Convention in these circumstances. 148
Similarly, under Article II, referral to arbitration is required
"unless [the court] finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed." 149 Where an antiarbitration state statute voids or makes inoperative arbitral
agreements in insurance contracts, the New York Convention
explicitly contemplates exemption from arbitration.1 5 0 Indeed,
conference proceedings leading to the adoption of the New York
Convention support a broad reading of the "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed" 15 1 clause.
During the conference proceedings, the Israeli delegate noted that, while a court could refuse enforcement of an awardthat
was incompatible with the law of the forum or public policy, "the
court had to refer parties to arbitration whether or not such reference was lawful or incompatible with public policy." 15 2 The
German delegate noted that this difficulty arose from the omission in Article 11(3) "of any words which would relate the arbitral
agreement to an arbitral award capable of enforcement under the
[New York] [C]onvention" and proposed adding language relating
an arbitral agreement to an arbitral award capable of enforcement under the New York Convention. 153
The German proposal failed to garner a two-thirds majority
vote, and Article II "was thus adopted without any words linking
agreements to the awards enforceable under the [New York]
Convention."154 This omission was also not corrected in the Report of the Drafting Committee.15 5 However, "the obligation to
refer parties to arbitration was (and still is) qualified by the
148 See id.
149 Id at Art 11(3).

150 See, for example, id at Art V.
151 New York Convention, Art 11(3) (cited in note 10).
152 See Scherk v Alberto-Culver Co, 417 US 506, 531 n 10 (1974) (Douglas dissenting),
quoting G. W. Haight, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Sunmary Analysis of Record of the United Nations Conference, May/June
1958, 27 (1958) (summarizing the conference proceedings; Haight had served as a member of the International Chamber of Commerce delegated to the Conference) ("Haight"
hereinafter).
153 Scherk, 417 US at 531 n 10 (Douglas dissenting), quoting Haight at 27.
154 See Scherk, 417 US at 531 n 10 (Douglas dissenting), quoting Haight at 28.
155 See Scherk, 417 US at 531 n 10 (Douglas dissenting), quoting Haight at 28.
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clause 'unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inop1 56
erative or incapable of being performed.'"
In light of the proceedings, Chief Justice Douglas of the
United States Supreme Court advocated a broad reading of the
"null or void" clause in Scherk vAlberto-Culver Co, 15 7 though the
majority ultimately decided the case on separate grounds.1 58 "As
the applicable law is not indicated, courts may under this wording be allowed some latitude; they may find an agreement incapable of performance if it offends the law or the public policy of
the forum."1 59 Though the delegates were unwilling to limit the
referralof an arbitral agreement, it would seem that they agreed
that a court may decline to enforce an agreementthat offends its
law or public policy. 160
The New York Convention contemplates and exempts arbitral agreements from being enforced under the New York Convention where agreements are incapable of performance because
they offend the law of a forum. Therefore, there is no direct conflict between the MFA and the New York Convention that would
require the New York Convention to be enforced "over all prior
inconsistent rules of law."161 Further, the New York Convention
was not intended to alter or change a citizen's rights under state
law,162 and it should not be considered an "inconsistent rule[ ] of
law."163
Therefore, while a later-in-time self-executing treaty supersedes a federal statute if there is a conflict,164 as discussed, the
New York Convention contemplates exceptions to enforcement of
arbitral agreements and awards that are "incapable of being performed."165 Accordingly, where the exceptions apply, there is no
inconsistency between the 1IFA and the New York Convention.

156 See Scherk, 417 US at 531 n 10 (Douglas dissenting), quoting Haight at 27-28

(emphasis added).

157 417 US 506 (1974)
1ss See generally Scherk, 417 US 506.
159 Id at 531 n 10 (Douglas dissenting), quoting Haight at 28 (emphasis added).
160 See Scherk, 417 US at 531 (Douglas dissenting), citing Haight at 27-28.

161 IndustriallskInsurers,141 F3d at 1440, quoting Sedco, 767 F2d at 1145.
162 See Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91 Cong, 2d Sess 44
(1970) (statement of Richard D. Kearney, Chairman of the Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on Private International Law).
163 Industriallsk Insurers,141 F3d at 1440, quoting Sedco, 767 F2d at 1145.
164 Cook v United States, 288 US 102, 118-19 (1933).
165 New York Convention, Art 11(3) (cited in note 10).
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Preserving the State Regulatory Regime of Insurance is Desirable

State regulation has been the status quo of insurance regulation. 6 6 "The states have the expertise. The states are closest to
the consumer, and the states have the tools and facilities to do
the job."167 As discussed, state regulation of insurance also provides benefits such as industry and citizen participation in government, greater flexibility in governance, and enhancement of
democracy through checks on various levels of government. So
that they may regulate insurance, some states require that insurance disputes be settled in courts of that state's jurisdiction. 168 To the extent that parties are able to contract around a
state regulatory regime and submit their disputes to arbitration,
states lose their ability to regulate insurance. State regulators
have made substantial investment in state regulation and have
the greatest stake in the continuation of state regulation.16 9 Because the business of insurance is strongly tied to the welfare of
a state's residents, state insurance regulatory schemes are best
suited to maximize state welfare.
If the New York Convention were to prevail over the MFA,
states would lose their ability to regulate insurance disputes
within their jurisdiction. On the other hand, where states void
arbitration agreements, parties maintain their freedom to contract in alternative forums to avoid regulatory schemes that they
do not wish to be subject to. This is because there is no conflict
between the MFA and the Convention Act where there is no underlying state law that is inconsistent with the Convention Act.
Resolving the conflict between the MFA and the Convention Act
in favor of state law enables states, which have most at stake in
the regulation of the business of insurance, to effect the most
efficient regulatory scheme, be it through requiring that disputes
be settled in their own courts, or by allowing parties the freedom
to contract for arbitration.
Further, because insurance companies in a state system retain the possibility of exit from a particularly invasive or burden166 See generally Randall, 26 Fla St U L Rev 625 (cited in note 3).
167 Id at 685, quoting Ronald Gift Mullins, Strong CongressionalDebate Role Urged
for Industry Regulators,J COM, June 11, 1997 at A8 (quoting a statement by Josephine
Musser, who was the 1997 National Association of Insurance Commissioners President
and Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner).
168 See, for example, La Rev Stat Ann § 22:868 (voiding arbitration agreements that
deprive Louisiana courts of jurisdiction over insurance actions).
169 See Randall, 26 Fla St U L Rev at 684 (cited in note 3).
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some regulatory regime, states will not unreasonably impose
burdensome regulations.1 7 0 If insurance companies prefer that
their arbitral agreements be enforced, their ability to contract in
alternative forums serves as a check to state regulatory regimes.
Indeed, exit would result in loss of coverage for state consumers,
substantial tax revenues, and employment opportunities. The
resolution proposed here therefore preserves the states' ability to
regulate insurance, without destroying the parties' ability to contract if they so wish. On the other hand, enforcing the New York
Convention over inconsistent state insurance laws reduces the
ability that states are able to regulate insurance, and may result
in a sub-optimal regulatory scheme because arbitral norms may
differ from state schemes. As a result, allowing states the power
to set the terms of their regulatory structure preserves the preferred regulatory scheme while maintaining parties' contractual
freedom through their ability to exit. In turn, the parties' exit
option serves as a check on state regulatory systems to ensure an
optimal regulatory scheme.
III. CONCLUSION

Where a state law regulating the business of insurance conflicts with the New York Convention, the MFA operates such
that state law should prevail over the New York Convention.
First, the New York Convention is not self-executing since the
New York Convention by its terms contemplates that its operation may be limited by the contracting state. And Congress has
done so through "necessary" implementing legislation. Second,
the MFA's application to the New York Convention cannot be
limited because Congressional intent in enacting the IFA contemplated its broad applicability. Third, the New York Convention specifically exempts enforcement of arbitral awards or
agreements where enforcement would offend the law of the forum. Fourth, allowing state law to reverse-preempt the New
York Convention preserves the preferable status quo that the
regulation of insurance remains within the states' hands. While
it may be argued that parties to arbitral agreements relating to
the business of insurance may enter such agreements with the
expectancy that they are enforced under the New York Convention, such parties have access to information as to the state's insurance laws under which they are governed. Further, "where a
170 See generally Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Declines
in Firms, Organizationsand States (Harvard 1970).
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treaty does not provide a particular remedy, either expressly or
implicitly, it is not for the federal courts to impose one on the
States through lawmaking of their own."in Therefore, where
state insurance law does not allow for enforcement on an arbitral
agreement, the MFA operates such that state law should prevail
over the New York Convention.

171 Sanchez-Llamas, 548 US at 347.

